that Plutarch was himself heartily engaged in this opinion, he discovering no small fondness for it, in sundry of his other writings; as, for example, in his Platonic questions, where he thus declares himself concerning it, *$* TO TroXXa/ctg ity* p. 1003. Par.

eyofjifvov aXr)0€£ Icrriv, 17 /uev *jap* avoug [xtonx]* [n]* [°1)er]* j, /cai TO ajuop^ov *GW/JLCI,* awvTrrjp^ov aXXvjXotc act, /cat ro oi5SfT£f>ov aVTWv, *yevtviv z^v* ovSc a^?}v" or else that

which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational soul, and an unformed disorderly body, did co-exist with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning. —And in his *Timcean Psychogonia* he does at large industriously maintain the same, there and elsewhere[3] endeavouring to establish this doctrine, as much as possibly he could, upon rational foundations. As, first, that nothing can be made or produced without a cause; and therefore there must of necessity, he some cause of evil also, arid that a positive one too ; he representing the opinion of those as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but fTmao&ov, an accidental appendix to the world, and all that evil which is in it, to have come in only by the bye, and by consequence, without any positive cause. Secondly, that God being essentially good could not possibly be the cause of evil, where he highly applauds Plato for removing God to the greatest distance imaginable from being the cause of eviL Thirdly, that as God could not, so neither could *v\n* aVoioc, matter in itself devoid of all form and quality, be the cause of evil, noting this to have been the subterfuge ,of the Stoics. Upon which account

[a] Libro de Iside et Osiride, p. 369, et Psychogon. p. 1014,1015. torn, ii, oper. .

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